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Abstract
Despite the extensive work on currency mismatches, research on the deter-
minants and effects of maturity mismatches is scarce. In this paper I show that
emerging market banks. maturity mismatches are negatively affected by capital
inflows and price volatilities. Furthermore, I find that banks with low maturity
mismatches are more profitable during crisis periods but less profitable otherwise.
The later result implies that banks face a tradeoff between higher returns and risk,
hence channeling short term capital into long term loans is caused by cronyism
and implicit guarantees rather than the depth of the financial market. The positive
relationship between maturity mismatches and price volatility, on the other hand,
shows that the banks of countries with high exchange rate and interest rate volatil-
ities can not, or choose not to hedge themselves. These results follow from a panel
regression on a data set I constructed by merging bank level data with aggregate
data. This is advantageous over traditional studies which focus only on aggregate
data.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E44, F32, F34, F41
Keywords: mergentonline, bank level data, maturity mismatches, liquidity,
profitability and debt structure ratios, price volatility.
1. Introduction: 
Currency and maturity mismatches, poor corporate governance and weak law 
enforcement have been proposed as the leading causes of the severe financial 
crises in the emerging markets during the past 10 years. While in the aftermath 
of the crises myriad of empirical and theoretical studies focused on the 
vulnerability of bank balance sheets with excessive short term foreign currency 
denominated debt to capital reversals, research on the role and nature of 
maturity mismatches that do not necessarily stem from large currency 
devaluations is scarce up to this point. 
This paper investigates the determinants and effects of maturity mismatches 
using bank level data.1 In this respect we identify and test capital inflows and 
interest and exchange rate volatilities as possible determinants of maturity 
mismatches and compare the post crisis performance of banks with high and low 
maturity mismatches before the crisis as well as during non crisis periods. This 
analysis provides answers to the following three questions. First, can we observe 
the heavily cited negative effect of capital inflows and outflows on maturity 
mismatches when we use bank level data and include non crisis periods as well 
as crises periods. Second, are maturity mismatches associated with poor 
profitability performance when we consider the whole sample period, crisis 
periods and non crisis periods respectively. Finally, if domestic banks are 
vulnerable to interest rate and exchange rate risks, do they protect themselves 
by lowering maturity mismatches. Thus can price volatility be another 
determinant of maturity mismatches? 
Studies using macroeconomic variables report the positive correlation between 
capital flows and maturity mismatches. While some research offers the 
channeling of cheap short term borrowings into long term credit financing 
                                                 
1 Since data on foreign assets and liabilities are not available, maturity mismatch variable utilized 
comprises domestic currency as well as foreign currency denominated debt, hence proxies the overall 
mismatch in the banking sector. 
unproductive investment as the source of maturity mismatches2, others have 
blamed short term finance on insufficient financial development and hence the 
reluctance of foreign creditors to offer long term funds3. Despite these 
explanations there is also evidence that countries in financial distress are inclined 
to issue more short term debt, hence the cause of maturity mismatches could be 
unrelated directly to financial development and crony capitalism but rather stem 
from macroeconomic instabilities that countries face. 
To gauge the relationship between capital flows and maturity mismatches, we 
estimate regression equations using different dependent and independent 
variables and controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals as well as country 
and time fixed effects. Different from the literature we use bank level data which 
in turn provides more degrees of freedom, allows us to differentiate between 
small and big banks and avoid causality problems that originate from the 
utilization of aggregate data. Our mixed findings are consistent with the literature 
and provide a partial support for the positive relationship between the two 
variables. We also find that capital inflows cause greater degree of maturity 
mismatches for bigger banks. 
Given the findings, next we would like to analyze the nature of this positive 
relationship and find whether if it is due to the fact that the depth of financial 
markets allow banks to diversify risks more easily and finance long term projects 
using short term loans or if cronyism and implicit guarantees are the underlying 
determinants of increasing maturity mismatches during periods marked with high 
capital inflows. We implicitly investigate the validity of these two arguments by 
reporting the performances of banks with different maturity mismatches following 
capital flow reversals. If a country has a deep financial market, these capital 
reversals should be relatively less important compared to countries with shallow 
markets and thus banking sector performance following capital reversals should 
be superior. More specifically regression equations using different proxies for 
                                                 
2 This hypothesis is thoroughly analyzed by the moral hazard literature. See Corsetti Pesenti and Roubini 
(1998).  
3 See for example Caballero and Krishnamurty (2003), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001), Fan, Titman and 
Twite (2004), Buch and Lusinyan (2003). 
maturity mismatches as independent variables of interest and different 
profitability ratios as the dependent variable are estimated. Furthermore, we 
distinguish financial crisis and non crisis periods to take account of the different 
dynamics governing the system during these periods.  
The three important results are as follows. First, maturity mismatches before 
financial crises are negatively related to profitability after the crisis or rather 
performance of banks with low maturity mismatches was superior to banks with 
high maturity mismatches. Second, in the absence of crisis, banks with high 
maturity mismatches have outperformed banks with low maturity mismatches. 
This observation implies that benefits of staying liquid outweigh the benefits 
associated with using this extra liquidity to increase revenue during crisis periods 
and that the opposite relationship holds in the absence of crises. Finally we find 
that banks with high maturity mismatches tend to be smaller than others. 
In the last section we test whether if countries with high interest rate and 
exchange rate volatilities hedge themselves against associated risks by holding 
more liquid assets and lending more short term or if the high price volatilities 
constrain the debt structure of these banks to shift towards short term funds. 
More specifically we estimate regression models using maturity mismatches as 
dependent variables and interest rate and exchange rate volatility as 
independent variables of interest. Our findings support the latter of the two 
explanations above or namely that banks become more illiquid and shift towards 
short term finance during periods of high price volatility and therefore do not or 
choose not to protect themselves against volatility associated risks. We also find 
that compared to capital inflows price volatility is not as significant in determining 
maturity mismatches. 
This paper is organized as follows. Part 2 discusses the data utilized and some 
preliminary findings that provide motivation for the rest of the paper. Part 3 
studies the relationship between capital flows and maturity mismatches. Part 4 
gauges the importance of maturity mismatches in economic performance for 
emerging market banks. Part 5 provides results from regression equations 
estimating the relationship between interest rate and exchange rate volatility and 
maturity mismatches. Part 6 concludes. 
Related Literature 
An important theoretical framework suitable to analyze the effects of maturity 
mismatches encountered during our survey of current literature was the Diamond 
Dybvig (1991) partial equilibrium bank run model where bank runs lead to 
immature liquidation of long term investments and increase output volatility. 
Chang and Velasco (1998) apply this framework to show how short term foreign 
currency denominated debt coupled with capital reversals increase the 
probability of financial crisis. A different category of models that involve the debt 
structure of firms is based on the Bernanke Gertler Gilchrist (1998) financial 
accelerator framework which has been used extensively to study balance sheet 
effects of currency mismatches when the economy faces external shocks and 
ensuing large exchange rate depreciation. In this respect Gertler Gilchrist and 
Natalucci (2001) extend this model to an open economy and show that under 
fixed exchange rate regimes output volatility increases when the economy 
experiences external shocks. 
Two other partial equilibrium models related to our paper are as follows. 
Bussiere, Fratzscher and Koeniger (2004) build a model to show how currency 
mismatches contribute to maturity mismatches which in turn increases output 
volatility. In their setup excess volatility of the exchange rate stimulates a switch 
from more costly long term debt to short term debt which in turn increases output 
volatility. Short term projects are more risky and increase the likelihood of a 
crisis. Rajan and Bird (2001) propose the optimizing behavior of banks as a 
determinant of maturity mismatches and show how financial crises can occur in 
the absence of moral hazard problems. 
Some of the related empirical literature on the other hand can be summarized as 
follows. 
Rodrik and Velasco (1999) point out the causal relationship between short term 
debt and the severity of currency crisis. Similar to part one of this paper they also 
search for the determinants of maturity mismatches and find that higher M2/GDP 
which in turn is a proxy for financial depth and per capita income levels lead to 
greater maturity mismatches.  
Valev (2004) investigates the relationship between economic volatility and the 
term structure of U.S. bank credit to emerging markets using bank level data. 
This analysis is similar in essence to part 5 of this paper. Different from Valev’s 
analysis part 5 measures the effect of economic uncertainty on maturity 
mismatches of domestic banks versus foreign lenders. De la Torre and 
Schmukler (2004) on the other hand discuss how coping with maturity 
mismatches by limiting short term contracts can lead to an exchange of one risk 
for another. More specifically a short term contract can offer savers protection 
against real interest rate risk but at the same time lead to a default risk by 
exposing the borrower to interest rate risk and thereby limiting their capacity to 
meet their obligations. 
Relevant to the analysis in part 4 of this paper, Tektas, Gunay and Gunay 
employ goal programming methodology to determine strategies like liquidity, 
foreign exchange holdings, credit risk, foreign exchange risk before and after 
financial crisis. The authors apply their optimal strategies to a risk averse and a 
risk taker bank in Turkey and show that increasing liquidity and capital adequacy 
increases rate of return on assets for both of these banks.  
Bleakley and Cowen (2004) oppose the view that links the cause of financial 
crises to short term debt by pointing out that countries in financial distress would 
be inclined to issue more short term debt and thus have maturity mismatches. 
Furthermore they find no significant difference between the amount of investment 
by firms with low and high maturity mismatches during capital reversals in 
emerging markets. Using micro level data similar to this paper the authors show 
that their results are robust to different specifications of investment and capital 
flows. While the authors consider the effects on investment of non financial 
sector firms this paper in part 2 analyzes the profitability of banks and 
distinguishes between crisis periods and non crisis periods. Consistent with our 
findings the authors point to the negative profitability effects of capital reversals 
on firms that have high maturity mismatches despite the absence of any effect on 
the level of investment. The paper uses liquidity measures4 such as quick ratio 
and current ratio as well as ratio of short term debt to total debt to approximate 
the degree of maturity mismatches since companies that are illiquid would be 
incapable of paying their maturing short term debt and hence increase the 
amount of short term debt to total debt by rolling over their debt. Hence 
throughout our paper, maturity mismatches refers to both liquidity variables as 
well as debt structure variables which will be defined below. 
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics: 
Contrary to the majority of the studies using aggregate data, bank level data is 
employed to identify the determinants and the effects of maturity mismatches. 
This methodology provides greater degrees of freedom and enables us to take 
account of smaller banks’ behavior which would not be possible with aggregate 
data.  Another appealing feature of using bank level data is to mitigate any 
causality concerns. More specifically our methodology implicitly assumes that 
macroeconomic variables are unlikely to be affected by individual bank balance 
sheet variables.  
For these purposes IFS (International Financial Statistics) and mergentonline 
datasets are merged. The panel data set consists of 18 emerging market 
countries and 214 depository institutions that are listed in the stock exchanges of 
these countries. Annual data from 1990 to 2004 are employed in the analysis. 
The contents of these datasets are provided in appendix A. The IFS dataset 
provides macroeconomic and financial sector variables which are utilized as 
controls and sources of volatility.  Balance sheet data along with profitability, debt 
management and asset management ratios are extracted from the mergentonline 
dataset. The latter is used to measure maturity mismatches and the performance 
of the individual banks. 
                                                 
4 Bleakley and Cowan (2004) use the difference between short term liabilities and current assets as a proxy 
for maturity mismatches.  
While outliers in the bank ratio variables are eliminated by omitting variables that 
deviate 10 times the standard deviation from the mean, outliers in the other 
balance sheet variables are not omitted to include the largest and the smallest 
banks in the sample. The size of the bank is accounted for by using a weighting 
scheme that will explained in the following sections. 
A preliminary synopsis of emerging bank debt structure is reported in table A. 
Country debt ratios in this table are weighted averages of individual bank ratios5. 
There are several important observations regarding these figures. First is that 
emerging market country banks have a high degree of short term debt to total 
debt ratios and these ratios are in general higher than figures reported for the 
corporate sector of these countries6. Another observation is that the increasing 
proportion of short term debt before a crisis decreases afterwards which supports 
the view that relatively unstable capital flows are mostly in the form of short term 
debt.  Finally Korean and Malaysian banks have acquired relatively more long 
term debt in the last three years partially reflecting the tightening in bank 
regulation and the process of deleveraging in these countries.7  
Table A 
Weighted Short Term Debt / Total Debt   
 90-94 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 IMF (*) 
Argentina 30.2 26.8 25.3 26.3 28.0 28.0 30.3 24.9 38.8 57.6 32.3 43.1
Brazil 74.9 94.0 90.1 66.7 84.3 91.4 83.6 82.2 74.0 82.0 91.1 23.5
Colombia 48.3 47.6 47.1 43.9 51.6 49.4 27.0 25.1 28.3 21.9 - 31.3
Egypt - - - - - 17.3 23.5 - 20.7 - - -
Korea 8.6 1.3 0.8 4.7 28.6 23.8 27.7 33.0 23.4 12.4 14.5 46.0
Malaysia 63.6 84.6 75.8 76.5 74.6 74.3 79.9 73.3 66.5 69.3 64.4 35.8
Mexico - - - 57.6 56.8 58.1 52.8 47.2 63.0 67.2 67.7 27.4
Panama 34.8 5.8 2.2 2.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.9 44.6 46.8 - -
Peru 31.9 22.0 16.7 17.6 16.7 17.6 26.2 18.7 29.2 36.6 29.7 -
Poland 31.9 46.6 49.1 48.3 36.2 43.2 27.2 - 51.4 - - 37.7
S. Africa 0.2 1.5 - - - - - 1.3 1.2 23.3 21.3 -
Turkey 39.1 49.3 75.1 62.8 32.5 - - - - - - 55.3
Venezuela - - 57.1 62.2 47.0 67.6 62.6 67.9 74.2 60.7 63.7 -
     
Average 32.3 37.9 43.9 44.5 41.5 41.0 40.1 38.1 42.9 47.8 50.0 35.7
(*) Global Financial Stability Report, April 2005; corporate sector 1993 – 2003 average.  
                                                 
5 Weights are the total assets of the banks. 
6 Except for Argentina and Korea weighted ratios are higher than the figures under the IMF column. 
7 Leverage is equal to total debt over total assets 
The positive relationship between capital inflows and short term debt ratios 
becomes more evident when we graph the two variables on the graph below. 
While short term debt / total debt variable is the last row in Table A which in turn 
reports GDP8 weighted average of debt ratios, capital inflows are approximated 
by GDP weighted  depository institution net foreign liabilities.  
As mentioned above prior to the Asian crisis increasing capital inflows were 
channeled into short term debt and following the crisis together with the 
developments in Brazil, Turkey and Argentina debt maturity structure of the 
emerging markets has shifted towards long term. The surge in emerging market 
capital inflows in the form of short term debt for the last two years on the other 
hand partially reflects the low yields in industrialized economies during this 
period. 
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Provided that the proportion of short term assets are constant, evidence above 
suggests that there may be a positive relationship between capital inflows and 
maturity mismatches.  
                                                 
8 In $’s 
Assuming that this relationship holds we would like to investigate whether 
maturity mismatches cause banking crises or magnify their effects. Although this 
relationship is either supported or assumed by numerous studies using macro 
data or theoretical models, bank level analysis is scarce up to this point.  
Table B provides an introductory analysis of the effects of maturity mismatches. 
The maturity mismatch variable of concern is Short Term Debt / Current Assets 
and the effects of these mismatches are measured by reporting the average rate 
of return on equity and assets of the corresponding group of banks. Banks in 
each country are categorized into groups depending on their level of maturity 
mismatches.9 
The main points that can be drawn from these summary statistics are the 
following.  
For a majority of the countries banks with low maturity mismatches have 
performed better in terms of profitability 1 year after the crisis compared to banks 
with high maturity mismatches. Despite this observation, linkage between the two 
variables is not significant between countries. For example while banks with high 
maturity mismatches in Brazil outperform banks with low maturity mismatches in 
Malaysia, they are dominated by Brazil’s own low maturity mismatch banks in 
terms of profitability performance.  
Another observation is that the difference between the two groups’ performance 
measures seems to narrow beyond the first year after the crisis. This observation 
signals the higher profitability of banks that channel their relatively higher short 
term debts into long term assets in the absence of crisis.   
Finally the last column of the table shows us that for every country banks with 
lower maturity mismatches are on average bigger in terms of assets compared to 
the other group. 
 
                                                 
9 Banks with ratios greater than the median ratio are classified as high maturity mismatch (MM) group  and 
as low MM otherwise. 
 Table B 
      Performance After Crisis   
   
1 year after 
crisis 
2 year after 
crisis 
3 year after 
crisis 
1-3 year 
average 
   
MM 
Before 
Crisis ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
% of  
Assets 
Argentina 
Low 
MM <0.93 3.58 0.85 9.63 1.02 10.75 0.67 7.99 0.85 14.16
  
High 
MM >0.93 8.81 1.55 14.48 0.50 12.15 1.50 11.81 1.18 4.24
Turkey 
Low 
MM <0.14 4.90 3.35 23.35 2.59 - - - - 32.52
  
High 
MM >0.14 3.21 2.99 28.61 4.08 - - - - 24.64
Brazil 
Low 
MM <0.43 20.47 2.42 15.85 1.46 14.14 0.52 16.82 1.47 12.76
  
High 
MM >0.43 4.91 0.86 6.92 1.01 12.55 1.61 8.13 1.16 6.28
Korea 
Low 
MM <0.37 10.86 0.55 16.50 0.35 6.53 0.45 11.29 0.45 17.31
  
High 
MM >0.37 -4.01 -0.33 4.05 0.24 3.86 0.24 1.30 0.05 7.69
Malaysia 
Low 
MM <0.21 1.15 0.10 1.76 0.17 8.72 0.88 3.88 0.38 10.45
  
High 
MM >0.21 0.49 0.03 2.60 0.20 10.55 0.84 4.55 0.36 6.21
Mexico 
Low 
MM <0.16 3.82 3.68 6.84 3.28 0.70 0.79 3.79 2.58 18.91
  
High 
MM >0.16 0.69 1.27 5.56 2.32 7.22 5.85 4.49 3.15 14.42
(*) The dates for the crisis are obtained from Kaminsky (2003) and balance sheet variables before crisis 
period are those reported on December 31st of the year before the crisis. The remaining countries in the 
sample are omitted due to small number of banks in the groups.  
If we assume that the two conclusions mentioned above hold the next question 
that we ask in this paper is, to what degree do banks protect themselves against 
interest rate and exchange rate risks. More specifically do the banks of countries 
with high interest and exchange rate volatilities choose to hold more liquid assets 
and have lower maturity mismatches.  
Table C below reports these volatilities along with weighted and non weighted 
quick ratios of the banks. The figures support the hypothesis mentioned above 
and show that in the majority of the cases banks of countries with high interest 
rate and exchange rate volatility choose to remain more liquid.  
Table C(*) 
  90-93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Argentina             
i-r vol. 30.41 6.22 13.32 4.69 4.91 8.22 9.06 10.00 35.15 45.71 15.49 7.32 
e-r vol. 5.93 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.73 2.73 1.28 
weig. QR 0.97 1.09 1.06 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.82 0.96 1.39 1.47 1.47 
Nonw.QR 1.16 1.12 1.12 1.00 0.95 0.96 0.87 0.79 1.00 1.09 1.15 1.23 
Brazil              
i-r vol. 34.41 28.83 12.10 5.75 12.37 13.75 10.01 2.17 5.00 4.12 4.75 3.01 
e-r vol. 24.57 22.94 1.48 0.58 0.59 0.66 7.23 1.75 4.11 5.47 3.51 2.30 
weig. QR 0.18 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.37 0.41 0.46 0.53 0.44 
nonw QR 0.36 0.40 0.49 0.48 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.40 
Korea              
i-r vol. 1.30  1.88 3.74 2.75 7.85 2.33 1.52 3.24 0.64 2.41 1.45 
e-r vol. 0.47 0.28 0.64 0.88 5.58 5.08 1.80 1.08 1.66 1.71 1.31 1.38 
weig. QR 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.20 0.22 0.49 1.00 0.68 0.58 0.53 0.32 0.32 
nonw QR 0.35 0.36 0.45 0.33 0.34 0.48 1.05 0.64 0.57 0.54 0.33 0.33 
Malaysia              
i-r vol. 1.95 5.08 2.06 0.83 2.43 5.07 4.23 0.79 0.65 0.03 0.52 0.00 
e-r vol. 0.59 1.31 0.85 0.41 3.79 4.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
weig. QR 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.24 
nonw.QR 0.72 0.77 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.19 3.89 3.45 2.08 0.28 
Mexico              
i-r vol. 4.92 10.52 20.70 8.75 5.42 6.26 5.26 4.48 8.62 4.53 5.64 4.07 
e-r vol. 0.53 2.35 8.47 1.22 1.24 2.34 1.48 1.38 1.39 1.07 2.09 1.20 
weig. QR 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.41 0.37 0.42 - 
nonw.QR 0.30 3.91 6.28 21.03 0.21 0.40 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.42 0.49 - 
Turkey              
i-r vol. 1.38 14.42 4.79 0.90 1.12 2.68 3.66 20.59 15.50 3.43 4.72 3.00 
e-r vol. 3.85 10.77 3.58 5.22 5.54 3.66 4.62 2.32 9.77 3.25 3.10 3.00 
weig. QR 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.48 - 
nonw.QR 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.48 - 
(*) Interest rate and exchange rate volatilities are annual averages of monthly percentage changes. 
     Weights are total assets and QR corresponds to quick ratio which is defined in appendix B. 
3. Capital Flows and Maturity Mismatches: 
Motivated by the limited evidence for the positive relationship between proportion 
of short term debt and capital inflows this section investigates whether depository 
institution balance sheets exhibit greater maturity mismatches when capital 
inflows increase.  
controlsothereffectsfixedcountryandtime
InflowsCapitalMismatchesMaturity
++
+= 10 ββ
      (1) 
A variety of fixed effects panel data GLS regressions as shown above are run 
using different dependent and independent variables which proxy maturity 
mismatches and capital inflows respectively. Definitions for the independent and 
dependent variables which represent capital flows and maturity mismatches 
respectively are provided in appendix B. 
Feasible GLS procedure involves first the estimation of the variance covariance 
matrix of the residuals form a simple OLS regression and then using this matrix 
to weigh the observations and obtain coefficient estimates.10 
There are two problems with the data that can render a panel study implausible. 
Most of the data is reported in local currency units and there are significant 
discrepancies in the inflation rates of these countries. To deal with these 
problems, independent variables are divided by GDP or converted to real dollar 
values using CPI and GDP deflator. While the former method emphasizes 
financially open economies the latter methods give more weight to the banks of 
relatively large countries. 
The summary of the results corresponding to GDP ratios is displayed in table 1.  
Each variable along with its standard error corresponds to the coefficient of the 
independent variable in the first column obtained from a regression of the 
dependent variable listed in row 1 on this variable and other control variables. 
The results show a mixed support for a positive relationship between maturity 
mismatches and capital inflows. The majority of the signs of significant 
coefficients corresponding to columns 2 through 5 which represent the strength 
of the banks in meeting their short term obligations are negative. Thus capital 
inflows lead to a disproportionate increase in current liabilities compared to 
                                                 
10 Missing observations are assigned 5 times the maximum value observed among the elements of the 
matrix in order to neglect them.  
current assets when we control for country and time fixed effects along with other 
macroeconomic variables.  
Similarly positive significant coefficients reported under columns 6 and 7 and the 
negative significant coefficients in column 8 shows us that banks’ debt maturity 
structure switches from long term to short term as capital flows into the country .   
While the most significant coefficients were recorded in regressions including the 
quick and the current ratio, BOP financial account, BOP net debt liabilities and 
deposit bank net foreign liabilities yielded significant coefficients robust to 
different specifications of maturity mismatches. The relatively greater importance 
of BOP net debt liabilities in affecting maturity mismatches compared to equity 
liabilities reflects the independence of bank balance sheets from private sector 
equity borrowing and possibility of the exposure of domestic banks to this extra 
amount of debt. 
Tables 1.1 to 1.7 show the details of the GDP ratio regression results 
summarized above.  The positive and negative relationship between lending 
rates and inflation with maturity mismatches show that as real interest rates 
increase for example, the drop in current assets due to increasing costs together 
with the choice of more short term borrowing with the rising rates causes greater 
maturity mismatches. While GDP growth and current account surpluses are 
negatively related to maturity mismatches which points to the ability and the 
choice of banks to switch from short term obligations to long term obligations as 
macroeconomic conditions improve. Conflicting with the above argument we find 
that budget deficits in a majority of the cases affect maturity mismatches 
positively. This observation is plausible if we consider the fact that banks’ current 
assets increase as some of the short term debt instruments issued by the 
government are held by these banks. Finally, consistent with the findings of 
Rodrik and Velasco M2/GDP ratio increases the degree of maturity mismatches 
pointing to the lower costs associated with carrying mismatches in financially 
developed markets.  
Regression results using capital inflows deflated by GDP deflator and CPI are 
represented in tables 1.8 and 1.9 respectively. The signs and significance of the 
control variables are similar to the GDP ratio regressions therefore are not 
included.  Except for a few number of regression the significance and signs of the 
capital inflow variable coefficients are robust to the two different methods of 
deflating.  
When we compare with the GDP ratio regressions, we observe the following. 
While net portfolio liabilities are more important determinants of maturity 
mismatches, deposit bank net foreign liabilities, total of central bank, government 
and deposit bank net foreign currency liabilities regressions yield less significant 
coefficients. The breakdown of significant coefficients with respect to the different 
dependent variables on the other hand is similar to table 1. 
Overall the proportions of regressions yielding significant coefficients out of the 
total number of regressions are similar and equal 25/49, 23/49 and 26/49 for 
GDP ratio, GDP deflator and CPI regressions respectively. 
Next, we run regressions based on country weighted average maturity 
mismatches. More specifically each firm’s maturity mismatch ratio variable is 
multiplied by its total assets and divided by the total assets of the banking in a 
specific year. This method is employed to give more weight to the maturity 
mismatches of large banks which have a greater access to foreign funds and 
hence are more prone to be affected by these flows. 
Experiments conducted up to now on the other hand give equal weight to every 
bank listed in the country’s stock exchange. The regressions equations estimated 
can be represented as follows, 
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, where k is the country index, kN is the number of banks in the country and 
maturity mismatch proxies are the seven dependent variables discussed above. 
Tables 1.10 and 1.11 display the results from the regressions with GDP ratios 
and CPI deflated variables and point to two important observations. First, all of 
the coefficients have the expected signs thereby signaling a positive capital 
inflow maturity mismatch association. Second, in both of the tables the proportion 
of regressions yielding significant coefficients has increased drastically such that 
out of 49 coefficients, 35 and 38 are significant for GDP ratio and CPI 
regressions respectively. The later observation supports the hypothesis above 
and shows us that bigger banks’ maturity mismatches increase to a greater 
extent when there is an increase in capital inflows compared to smaller banks. 
Control variable coefficients and regression results corresponding to variables 
deflated by the GDP deflator are not reported because of their similarity to 
previous regression results and CPI deflated variables results respectively. 
There are two important explanations offered regarding this partial evidence 
supporting the positive relationship between maturity mismatches and capital 
inflows. One is that with relatively deeper financial markets depository institutions 
which are able to diversify risk can afford to and choose to finance long term 
projects using cheaper short term funds hence choose to have greater maturity 
mismatches. Second cronyism and implicit guarantees could be the reasons for 
using capital inflows to fund inefficient long term projects without hedging these 
long term asset positions by acquiring more long term debt.  
The next section implicitly investigates the validity of these two arguments by 
reporting the performances of banks with different maturity mismatches following 
capital flow reversals. If a country has a deep financial market, these capital 
reversals should be relatively less important compared to countries with shallow 
markets and thus banking sector performance following capital reversals should 
be superior. 
 
4. Maturity Mismatches and Profitability Performance: 
In this section the relative profitability of banks with high and low maturity 
mismatches is compared. When conducting this experiment one has to take 
account of the different consequences of maturity mismatches during and in the 
absence of financial crises.  
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In this respect GLS panel data regressions as shown above are performed 
initially for the whole sample period to determine the overall effect of maturity 
mismatches on profitability. Following this analysis, the relationship between 
maturity mismatches before a financial crisis and profitability afterwards is 
measured by omitting time periods of countries that are not included in the 
Kaminsky (2003) classification of crises list. Finally to check whether if there is an 
incentive for banks to lend long term using short term funds or similarly if large 
banks that can afford to have maturity mismatches are more profitable in the 
absence of large economic disturbances, the same experiment is conducted by 
excluding periods corresponding to crises. 
A total of 49 regressions are run that correspond to the 7 different profitability and 
maturity mismatch variables for each sample period discussed above. Proxies for 
profitability along with the definitions are provided in appendix B. The variables 
that proxy maturity mismatches are the same as in part 3. 
Table 2.1 reports regressions results corresponding to quick ratio as the 
independent variable of interest using the whole sample period. Initial 
observation is that all of the independent variables have positive coefficients and 
4 out of 7 of them are significant at 5%.  
The insignificance of Rate of Return on Investment (ROI) and Operating Margin 
(OM) can due to the insufficient amount of observations of these two variables. 
Positive coefficients provide a partial support for the hypothesis that the more 
liquid banks are the higher are their profits, for the whole sample period.  
When we examine the control variable coefficients we observe that deposit bank 
net foreign liabilities are negatively related in a majority of the cases indicating 
the adverse effect of exposure to currency risk on profitability. M2/GDP ratio 
coefficient, which is a measure of financial depth, is positive in majority of the 
cases pointing to greater profitability in more developed financial markets.  
Coefficients of macroeconomic fundamental variables on the other hand indicate 
a positive relationship between favorable macroeconomic conditions and bank 
performance. In this respect while banks make less profit when there is more 
inflation, budget deficit and current account deficit; GDP growth in most cases 
increases profitability. 
Tables 2.2 to 2.6 report the coefficients and the corresponding standard errors of 
the maturity mismatch variables for the 49 regression equations that are 
estimated for the overall sample, crisis periods and non crisis periods 
respectively.  
Summary of the results are provided in the table below. While the second column 
shows the proportion of regressions with a significant maturity mismatch 
coefficient, the third column reports the proportion of significant coefficients which 
imply a negative causal relationship between maturity mismatches and 
profitability. 
 # of Significant Coefficients # of Negative Relationships 
Overall, Non Weighted 35/49 29/35 
Overall, Weighted 23/49 21/23 
Crisis, 1 year before 12/21 12/12 
Crisis, 2 year before 8/21 8/8 
Crisis, 3 year before 12/21 3/12 
Non Crisis, Non Weighted 33/49 13/33 
Non Crisis, Weighted 26/49 24/26 
There are two conflicting effects of maturity mismatches on profitability. The first 
affect is that banks which choose to lend more short term and seek long term 
finance would profit less due to insufficient amount of finance and low quality of 
loans to the private sector. On the other hand these banks with low maturity 
mismatches would be more capable of avoiding liquidity problems and hence 
credit and currency risks. Furthermore given the evidence in part 2 we know that 
smaller banks have higher maturity mismatches and would be characterized with 
higher profits in the absence of crises and lower profits during and immediately 
after the crises. 
Table 2.2 and 2.3 reconciles these effects by using non weighted and weighted 
variables respectively with weights being total assets of the individual banks 
similar to part 3. The latter scheme gives more weight to larger banks and is 
used to measure the relationship between total maturity mismatches and total 
profitability in the country whereas choosing not to use weights provides 
estimates of the effect of average maturity mismatches on average profitability of 
the banking sector. 
The most important observation is that in majority of the cases for both of the 
methods there is a negative relationship between maturity mismatches and 
profitability11 which is due to the higher profitability of low maturity mismatch 
banks during and after financial crises12 and the fact that this effect dominates 
the higher profitability of high maturity mismatch banks in the absence of crises. 
More specifically out of 35 and 23 significant coefficients in non weighted and 
weighted regressions 29 and 21 have the signs consistent with a negative 
relationship respectively.  
                                                 
11 The signs of rows 1,2,3,4,7 and 5,6 are expected to be positive and negative respectively if profitability 
is affected negatively by maturity mismatches. 
 
12 There are 16 crisis periods in our sample: Argentina (02), Brazil (91,99), Colombia( 95,97,98,99), 
Korea(97), Malaysia (97,98), Mexico(94), Philippines(97), Turkey(94,01), Venezuela(94,95). 
While smaller number of significant coefficients in weighted regressions can be 
attributed to the loss in degrees of freedom after aggregating the data by taking 
weighted averages, the higher proportion of negative relationships under this 
scheme is due to the averaging out of smaller banks which are more profitable 
and have higher maturity mismatches.  
Table 2.4 on the other hand tabulates the coefficients from the following set of 
regressions, 
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The low proportion of significant coefficients are due to relatively small number of 
observations left after eliminating periods not corresponding to financial crises. 
Regressions using ROI, PTM, NPM, OM as dependent variables could not be run 
for the same reason. 
The main observation is that in the 1 and 2 year before categories all of the 
significant coefficients indicate a negative relationship. More specifically banks 
that have had low maturity mismatches before the crisis were able to make more 
profits 1 and 2 years later.  
The observation that majority of the coefficients reflect positive relationship for 
the 3 years before category on the other hand is consistent with the earlier 
descriptive statistics reporting greater profitability for smaller firms with high 
maturity mismatches in the absence of crises.  
Finally the Domestic Credit column shows us that there is a weak negative 
causal relationship between maturity mismatches and credit extended by these 
banks and that this relationship disappears after the first year of the crisis. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Bleakley and Cowan (2004) or namely that 
corporate investment is not affected by capital reversals. 
To check the robustness of the claim above that in absence of crisis greater 
maturity mismatches imply greater profitability, regressions omitting periods 
corresponding to crises are conducted.  
The results in tables 2.5 and 2.6 provide support for the above hypothesis such 
that non weighted regressions giving equal weights to firms reflect a positive 
relationship between maturity mismatches and profitability. Finally the high 
proportion of coefficients showing a negative relationship under the weighted 
framework indicates greater profitability for countries with relatively liquid markets 
in the absence of crises. 
Different profitability proxies were intended to provide a robustness check and 
did not reveal any clear distinction in terms of significance frequency except for 
high and low numbers of significance observed for GM, 1 and 2 year after the 
crisis and ROE in weighted regressions. 
5. Price Volatility and Maturity Mismatches 
Provided that there is evidence supporting the positive relationship between 
capital inflows and maturity mismatches and that the latter reduces profitability, 
we would like to examine if banks protect themselves from related price risks by 
staying more liquid and having low maturity mismatches or if the negative affects 
of volatility diminish current assets and constrain finance to comprise more short 
term debt. 
More precisely we would like to measure the relationship between maturity 
mismatches and interest and exchange rate volatilities to test the hypothesis that 
the banking sector of countries with more volatile prices choose to stay more 
liquid and keep their maturity mismatches low. 
In this respect we estimate the following regression equation using the same 
methods employed in the previous parts. 
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, where 
k
itσ corresponds to exchange rate and interest rate volatility. 
While maturity mismatch and the control variables are the same as in parts 3 and 
4, we use 3 and 2 different measures of exchange rate and interest rate volatility 
respectively.  
There is mixed evidence in the literature advocating the use of trade weighted 
exchange rates. This rate is a good indicator of the exchange rate exposure of 
the country as a whole but is inappropriate when applied to every firm in the 
sample.13 Since there is no consensus in theory as to which exchange rate is 
suitable for each country we use dollar exchange rates, equally weighted and 
region adjusted14 exchange rates consisting of dollar, yen and euro15.  
Lending and deposit rates are employed to measure interest rate volatility. The 
distinction between the two rates is motivated by the literature showing how the 
risk premium component of the interest rate spread increases as macroeconomic 
variables become more volatile, which in turn implies a greater volatility in 
interest earnings of banks relative to interest cost.16 
Volatility of interest rates and exchange rates are calculated by dividing standard 
deviation of monthly values by the annual averages. While exchange rates 
employed are monthly averages of national currency per dollar, yen or euro, 
interest rates are in percentages. 
The results are displayed in tables 3.1 to 3.4 and summarized below for 
convenience.  
                                                 
13 Dominquez and Tesar (2001) show that trade weighted exchange rates can lead to an under estimation of 
foreign exchange exposure. 
14 This measure is used due to unavailability of trade weighted exchange rates. The weights are as follows: 
South America and Africa =  60% $, 20%Euro, 20%Yen, East Asia=60%Yen, 20% 20% Euro, 
Europe=60% Euro, 20% Dollar, 20% Yen.  
15 Up to Jan. 1999, DM is used instead for euro. 
16 See Saunders and Schumacher (2000). 
The third and fourth columns show the proportion of significant coefficients 
indicating a positive relationship between price volatility and maturity mismatches 
for the liquidity variables and debt structure variables which in turn correspond to 
columns 1 to 4 and 5 to 7 of tables 3.1 to 3.4 respectively. 
 # of significant 
coefficients 
# of liquidity vars. With a 
positive relationship  
# of debt vars. with a 
positive relationship 
Overall, Non Weighted 5/35 3/4 0/1 
Overall,  Weighted 15/35 7/7 5/8 
Non Crisis, Non Weighted 10/35 0/3 7/7 
Non Crisis, Weighted 19/35 13/13 5/6 
As in the previous chapter we take account of bank size and the effects of 
banking crises by running regressions with weighted and non-weighted maturity 
mismatches and omitting the crisis periods from the sample respectively. 
There are three main conclusions drawn from the above table. Most of the 
significant coefficients illustrate the negative relationship between price volatility 
and maturity mismatches. This observation implies that banks choose not to or 
are incapable of hedging themselves against currency and interest rate risks by 
staying more liquid and borrowing more long term. 
Second observation is that larger banks’ liquidity and maturity mismatches are 
affected negatively from excess interest rate and exchange rate volatility to a 
greater extent as general weighted regression coefficients indicating a significant 
negative relationship are more abundant compared to non weighted regressions 
except for non crisis debt structure regressions.  
Finally the number of significant coefficients increases when we omit crisis 
periods although there are some exceptions when we categorize the dependent 
variables into liquidity and debt structure groups.   
In this respect, while smaller banks’ debt structure coefficients imply a strong 
negative relationship in the absence of crisis, all of the significant liquidity 
coefficients support a positive relationship under this category. This observation 
can reflect the choice of smaller banks to remain liquid due to their inability to 
borrow long term during periods of high price volatility.  
Coefficients of the control variables are omitted from the tables since they are 
similar to ones in table 1.1 to 1.6. When we examine the breakdown of significant 
coefficients under different dependent and independent variable definitions we 
can observe that while there is no distinct inference from using different 
exchange rates17, lending rates seem to have a more significant effect on 
maturity mismatches under the weighted scheme.  
The last observation reflects the fact that bank balance sheets are more 
vulnerable to lending rates, which is in turn consistent with increasing volatility of 
interest spreads during periods of high price volatility. 
Overall the main conclusion of this section is that although compared to capital 
inflows price volatility is not as significant in determining maturity mismatches, 
the relationship suggests that banks become more illiquid and shift towards short 
term finance during periods of high price volatility and therefore do not or choose 
not to protect themselves against volatility associated risks.  
The evidence supporting this behavior is stronger for larger banks and in non 
crisis periods. The former claim suggests that larger banks are less risk averse 
and are more capable of borrowing during periods of macroeconomic instability 
hence shifting these risks to consumers, investors, government and smaller 
banks. The later claim on the other hand hints at more strict regulation restricting 
banks to hold more liquid assets and limit their long term loans.  
Although analyzing the answers to these questions is outside the scope of this 
paper, evidence in part 4 reporting the inferior performance of banks with high 
maturity mismatches before crises is consistent with the latter claim.  
                                                 
17 Experiments employing Euro and Yen exchange rates only did not produce conflicting results.  
6. Conclusion: 
This paper studies the nature of maturity mismatches in emerging market 
banking sectors which have been associated with severe financial crisis in some 
of these countries. We find that capital inflows and price volatility reduce maturity 
mismatches and that banks with low maturity mismatches before the crisis 
perform better in terms of profitability than other banks despite performing 
relatively poorly in the absence of crises.  
Our analysis does not take account of interaction between currency mismatches 
and maturity mismatches due to absence of data on foreign liabilities and assets 
and their maturities at the individual bank level. It would be interesting for further 
research to measure how much of the deterioration in the debt structure of the 
banking sector is due to exchange rate effects and interest rate changes alone 
and model the interactions between interest rate and exchange rate associated 
risks.  
Modeling the effects of maturity mismatches that allows for these interactions 
would require a general equilibrium framework. Despite our survey of the 
literature we failed to come across a general equilibrium model that studies how 
banks with long term assets and short term liabilities, some of which are foreign 
currency denominated, faces liquidity problems when capital reversals lead to 
depreciation of the real exchange rates. In this respect it would be interesting to 
build maturity mismatches into a Bernanke Gertler Gilchrist model or a sudden 
stop type model to explain the drops in output during capital reversals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
AppendixA: 
 
Appendix B: 
Banking Sector Variables: 
Liquidity and Debt Management  
Quick Ratio = A measure of a company's liquidity, used to evaluate 
creditworthiness. Equals quick assets divided by current liabilities.  
Quick Assets = Cash and other assets which can or will be converted into cash 
fairly soon, such as accounts receivable and marketable securities; or 
equivalently, current assets minus inventory. 
Current Ratio = Current assets divided by current liabilities. An indication of a 
company's ability to meet short-term debt obligations; the higher the ratio, the 
more liquid the company is. 
Current Assets = A balance sheet item which equals the sum of cash and cash 
equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory, marketable securities, prepaid 
expenses, and other assets that could be converted to cash in less than one 
year. A company's creditors will often be interested in how much that company 
has in current assets, since these assets can be easily liquidated in case the 
company goes bankrupt. 
Current Liabilities = A balance sheet item which equals the sum of all money 
owed by a company and due within one year. 
Current Ratio (Balance sheet) = Current ratio defined above is reported 
separately by mergent online. For some banks and time periods although 
balance sheet items are reported ratios, corresponding ratios are missing. 
Therefore current ratio variable based on the balance sheet values is created. 
Current Ratio (Balance sheet + Ratio) = This ratio is constructed to check 
robustness.  Current liabilities are obtained by multiplying Current 
Liabilities/Equity ratio with Equity value from the balance sheet. This variable in 
turn is divided by current assets to determine the current ratio. 
Short term debt = Loans and obligations with a maturity of less than one year. 
Short term debt / Assets = Short term debt is as follows. First total debt to equity 
is multiplied with equity to obtain total debt. Second long term debt to assets ratio 
is multiplied with assets to obtain long term debt. Finally short term debt is found 
by subtracting long term debt from total debt. 
Long term debt / Assets = As mentioned above this ratio is reported directly by 
mergentonline and represents the ratio of loans and obligations with a maturity of 
more than one year and total assets. 
Profitability (variables are in percentages) 
Return on Equity = A measure of how well a company used reinvested earnings 
to generate additional earnings, equal to a fiscal year's after-tax income (after 
preferred stock dividends but before common stock dividends) divided by book 
value, expressed as a percentage. It is used as a general indication of the 
company's efficiency; in other words, how much profit it is able to generate given 
the resources provided by its stockholders. 
Return on Assets = A measure of a company's profitability, equal to a fiscal 
year's earnings divided by its total assets, expressed as a percentage. 
Return on Investment = Equal to a fiscal year's income divided by common stock 
and preferred stock equity plus long-term debt. 
Gross Margin = Gross income divided by net sales, expressed as a percentage. 
Pre-Tax Margin = Net profit before taxes divided by net sales. 
Net Profit Margin = Net profit divided by net revenues, often expressed as a 
percentage. This number is an indication of how effective a company is at cost 
control. 
Operating Margin = Operating income divided by revenues, expressed as a 
percentage. 
 
 
 
Capital Flow Variables: 
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities = The difference between portfolio investment 
liabilities and assets reported in the balance of payments accounts. The item 
includes transactions with nonresidents in financial securities of any maturity 
(such as corporate securities, bonds, notes, and money market instruments) 
other than those included in direct investment, exceptional financing, and reserve 
assets. 
Net Portfolio Investment Position = Stock of net external liabilities. Reflects not 
only the sum of balance of payments transactions over time, but also price 
changes, exchange rate changes, and other adjustments. 
CB + GOV + DB Net Foreign Liabilities = The sum of net foreign liabilities of the 
monetary authority, government and deposit banks. 
BOP Financial Account = Net sum of direct investment, portfolio investment, 
financial derivatives and other investment in the balance of payments accounts. 
BOP Net Debt Liabilities = Covers bonds, debentures, notes, etc., and money 
market or negotiable debt instruments. 
BOP Net Equity Liabilities = Includes shares, stocks, participation, and similar 
documents that usually denote ownership of equity. 
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Table 1.1
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities / GDP 0.42 0.06 -0.81 -1.38 -0.02 -0.05 -1.50
(0.23) (0.25) (1.08) (0.66) (0.02) (0.04) (0.52)
intercept 0.41 0.21 -6.66 -1.46 0.08 -0.03 -0.16
(0.14) (0.16) (0.61) (0.50) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
m2 / gdp -0.42 -4.34 -11.92 -6.26 0.29 0.31 -1.44
(1.30) (1.45) (6.15) (3.96) (0.12) (0.21) (0.26)
current account deficit / gdp -3.04 -1.35 -2.97 1.42 0.41 0.22 -0.36
(1.18) (1.32) (5.69) (3.37) (0.12) (0.18) (0.23)
budget deficit / gdp 4.95 7.08 1.77 5.06 0.57 -0.70 0.68
(0.95) (1.06) (4.40) (3.16) (0.10) (0.19) (0.20)
lending rate 0.0103 0.0152 0.0260 0.0186 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0014
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
gdp growth -0.0076 -0.0019 -0.0878 0.0260 -0.0005 -0.0012 0.0032
(0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0177) (0.0110) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0008)
inflation -0.0048 -0.0077 -0.0111 -0.0042 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0002
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0062) (0.0044) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
inflation(-1) -0.0016 -0.0040 -0.0205 -0.0093 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0014
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0046) (0.0031) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
gdp growth(-1) -0.0130 -0.0251 -0.1063 -0.0489 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0023
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0172) (0.0114) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009)
m2 / gdp (-1) -0.24 0.08 -5.55 -1.90 0.06 0.07 -0.08
(0.12) (0.13) (0.55) (0.38) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 0.28 -0.18 -2.41 -0.08 0.04 0.08 -0.10
(0.15) (0.17) (0.74) (0.43) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) -0.31 0.17 -0.21 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04
(0.08) (0.09) (0.35) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
Table 1.2
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
Net Portfolio Investment Position / 
GDP -2.38 -2.38 -0.61 -0.53 0.04 0.20 -0.22
(0.19) (0.22) (1.03) (2.02) (0.04) (0.08) (1.11)
intercept 0.70 0.62 -0.74 -1.51 0.01 -0.25 -0.14
(0.11) (0.13) (0.59) (0.79) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
m2 / gdp -9.14 -8.76 4.32 -6.11 0.12 1.58 -2.61
(1.21) (1.38) (6.36) (10.15) (0.18) (0.35) (0.36)
current account deficit / gdp -7.56 -6.46 7.54 6.27 -0.03 1.13 0.71
(0.98) (1.12) (5.19) (7.35) (0.16) (0.26) (0.28)
budget deficit / gdp 5.70 5.87 0.57 4.68 0.16 -0.63 1.00
(0.81) (0.93) (4.10) (6.25) (0.12) (0.25) (0.24)
lending rate 0.0111 0.0125 0.0074 0.0020 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0029
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0089) (0.0125) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
gdp growth 0.0151 0.0161 0.0260 0.0560 -0.0003 0.0015 0.0007
(0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0185) (0.0246) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0011)
inflation 0.0003 0.0000 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
inflation(-1) -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
gdp growth(-1) -0.0084 -0.0072 -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0003
(0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0146) (0.0201) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0010)
m2 / gdp (-1) -6.53 -5.57 15.27 26.17 0.01 1.33 -1.07
(1.27) (1.45) (6.56) (10.27) (0.19) (0.36) (0.38)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) -3.32 -2.74 2.88 8.80 -0.06 1.02 -0.62
(1.15) (1.31) (6.10) (8.91) (0.16) (0.29) (0.32)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) -0.50 -0.22 -0.35 3.55 0.19 0.44 0.32
(0.64) (0.72) (3.18) (4.86) (0.08) (0.17) (0.19)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
  
Table 1.3
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
Deposit Bank Net Foreign Liab. / 
GDP -3.42 -1.35 -2.05 -3.68 0.41 0.61 -10.53
(0.42) (0.58) (1.40) (2.20) (0.07) (0.11) (1.66)
intercept 0.56 0.60 -0.93 -1.24 0.01 0.04 -0.09
(0.10) (0.13) (0.37) (0.57) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
m2 / gdp -2.56 -4.15 -5.02 6.53 -0.05 0.40 -0.78
(0.94) (1.31) (3.35) (5.30) (0.14) (0.21) (0.29)
current account deficit / gdp 1.90 1.85 -18.52 -19.51 0.67 0.47 -1.26
(1.20) (1.66) (4.61) (6.30) (0.21) (0.24) (0.36)
budget deficit / gdp 4.95 6.91 -1.24 2.42 0.55 0.40 -0.10
(0.65) (0.90) (2.37) (3.75) (0.10) (0.15) (0.20)
lending rate 0.0070 0.0108 0.0048 0.0102 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0044) (0.0064) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
gdp growth 0.0028 0.0081 0.0191 0.0364 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0033
(0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0091) (0.0132) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0008)
inflation -0.0050 -0.0071 -0.0041 -0.0085 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
inflation(-1) -0.0008 -0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
gdp growth(-1) 0.0097 0.0165 -0.0086 -0.0276 0.0007 -0.0028 0.0022
(0.0027) (0.0038) (0.0103) (0.0154) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0009)
m2 / gdp (-1) -1.54 -3.19 -13.69 -17.21 -0.01 0.32 -0.42
(0.80) (1.11) (2.62) (4.38) (0.12) (0.19) (0.27)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 2.10 0.09 -8.03 -9.84 1.09 0.43 0.22
(1.64) (2.28) (6.30) (8.67) (0.26) (0.36) (0.53)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 2.16 1.45 -0.67 0.08 0.18 0.23 -0.56
(0.54) (0.74) (1.92) (2.85) (0.07) (0.11) (0.16)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
Table 1.4
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
CB + GOV + DB Net For. Curr. Liabs/G 0.58 2.26 11.31 1.31 -0.06 0.19 1.54
(0.19) (0.36) (1.17) (1.44) (0.04) (0.07) (0.97)
intercept 1.18 1.34 -1.75 -1.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.03
(0.09) (0.17) (0.64) (0.70) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
m2 / gdp -0.30 -1.92 -14.82 -2.23 -0.04 0.14 -0.90
(0.87) (1.70) (6.40) (7.14) (0.17) (0.30) (0.31)
current account deficit / gdp -1.85 -2.09 -4.93 4.26 -0.18 0.51 -0.66
(0.77) (1.51) (6.56) (5.64) (0.16) (0.22) (0.26)
budget deficit / gdp 8.93 9.56 -9.33 8.12 0.54 0.70 -0.92
(0.63) (1.23) (4.72) (5.11) (0.13) (0.24) (0.24)
lending rate 0.0096 0.0093 -0.0189 0.0103 -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004)
gdp growth 0.0065 0.0037 0.0443 0.0204 -0.0011 -0.0033 0.0070
(0.0023) (0.0045) (0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008)
inflation -0.0049 -0.0073 -0.0119 -0.0086 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0002
(0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
inflation(-1) -0.0013 -0.0007 0.0065 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
gdp growth(-1) -0.0329 -0.0371 -0.0583 -0.0812 0.0007 0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0060) (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0011)
m2 / gdp (-1) -0.34 -0.33 -29.82 2.25 0.37 0.84 1.31
(0.72) (1.41) (4.88) (6.01) (0.15) (0.27) (0.28)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) -3.28 -4.56 5.26 8.00 -0.03 -0.48 0.43
(1.05) (2.05) (8.99) (7.86) (0.22) (0.30) (0.34)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 2.28 2.09 0.10 3.13 0.05 -0.26 0.51
(0.49) (0.96) (3.67) (3.66) (0.08) (0.15) (0.17)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
Table 1.5
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Financial Account / GDP -1.46 -1.36 -16.09 -0.13 -0.09 0.48 -7.74
(0.42) (0.47) (1.65) (1.49) (0.05) (0.09) (1.16)
intercept 0.85 0.61 -1.38 -1.37 0.02 -0.08 -0.21
(0.12) (0.13) (0.51) (0.44) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
m2 / gdp -1.63 -2.73 -11.68 3.67 0.28 0.34 -1.07
(1.20) (1.34) (5.35) (4.41) (0.11) (0.22) (0.25)
current account deficit / gdp -5.77 -3.97 -32.71 1.86 0.66 1.06 -1.21
(1.38) (1.55) (5.99) (4.80) (0.14) (0.25) (0.29)
budget deficit / gdp 5.50 7.43 5.54 5.39 -0.26 0.19 0.49
(0.82) (0.91) (3.68) (3.15) (0.08) (0.15) (0.16)
lending rate 0.0092 0.0145 0.0329 0.0199 0.0002 0.0000 0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
gdp growth -0.0023 -0.0005 -0.0288 0.0171 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0022
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0145) (0.0118) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0007)
inflation -0.0060 -0.0095 -0.0380 -0.0074 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0057) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
inflation(-1) -0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0117 -0.0054 0.0000 0.0003 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
gdp growth(-1) -0.0128 -0.0222 -0.0690 -0.0391 0.0005 0.0009 0.0004
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0157) (0.0126) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008)
m2 / gdp (-1) 2.24 1.23 -33.66 -22.05 0.48 0.60 -1.02
(1.07) (1.20) (4.23) (4.06) (0.11) (0.21) (0.23)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 2.37 -1.86 -37.74 -0.13 0.39 0.58 -1.01
(1.42) (1.58) (6.69) (4.95) (0.15) (0.22) (0.27)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 3.53 2.18 2.33 0.44 0.11 0.06 0.57
(0.79) (0.88) (3.31) (2.80) (0.07) (0.13) (0.15)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
Table 1.6
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Debt Liabilities / GDP 0.54 -0.51 -4.36 -3.31 0.00 0.26 -1.35
(0.27) (0.30) (1.38) (1.00) (0.02) (0.04) (0.61)
intercept 0.46 0.39 -7.05 -1.30 0.03 0.12 -0.75
(0.22) (0.23) (1.00) (0.95) (0.02) (0.05) (0.46)
m2 / gdp -1.26 -4.19 -22.98 4.70 0.38 0.67 -2.57
(2.09) (2.35) (10.76) (8.11) (0.20) (0.35) (5.01)
current account deficit / gdp -2.81 -0.78 0.86 2.77 0.42 0.32 -9.77
(1.81) (2.03) (9.31) (6.55) (0.18) (0.27) (4.56)
budget deficit / gdp 5.96 8.55 1.97 9.51 -0.56 -0.71 3.90
(1.45) (1.63) (7.17) (6.18) (0.17) (0.29) (4.24)
lending rate 0.0105 0.0151 0.0269 0.0177 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0016
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0096) (0.0076) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0050)
gdp growth -0.0070 0.0017 -0.0539 0.0361 -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0502
(0.0062) (0.0069) (0.0311) (0.0222) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0138)
inflation -0.0048 -0.0079 -0.0109 -0.0051 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0060
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0102) (0.0086) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0048)
inflation(-1) -0.0021 -0.0049 -0.0223 -0.0116 0.0002 0.0006 -0.0088
(0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0076) (0.0060) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0040)
gdp growth(-1) -0.0145 -0.0277 -0.1143 -0.0523 0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0272
(0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0282) (0.0219) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0157)
m2 / gdp (-1) -3.36 1.40 -47.72 -21.99 0.64 0.38 -17.88
(1.86) (2.09) (9.35) (7.65) (0.19) (0.34) (4.83)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 3.25 -2.73 -36.90 -2.88 0.49 1.30 -2.80
(2.53) (2.83) (12.98) (9.06) (0.28) (0.38) (6.84)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 3.09 1.33 -3.69 -0.39 0.17 -0.20 2.80
(1.26) (1.41) (6.11) (4.68) (0.12) (0.21) (2.91)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
  
Table 1.7
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Equity Liabilities / GDP -15.03 -8.92 -2.46 2.35 1.88 4.35 2.27
(3.41) (4.00) (8.81) (17.83) (0.97) (2.54) (8.66)
intercept -0.71 -1.50 -1.26 -0.76 0.05 0.16 -0.21
(0.25) (0.29) (0.73) (1.75) (0.03) (0.11) (0.20)
m2 / gdp 4.70 10.24 -0.18 -3.28 0.36 0.61 2.15
(1.80) (2.11) (5.02) (13.54) (0.19) (0.48) (1.06)
current account deficit / gdp -13.21 -16.06 4.74 -1.37 0.00 0.00 -0.43
(2.35) (2.76) (7.05) (15.34) (0.00) (0.00) (1.33)
budget deficit / gdp 1.44 8.80 1.00 15.74 -0.13 0.05 0.53
(1.27) (1.49) (3.69) (7.28) (0.20) (0.51) (1.04)
lending rate 0.0111 0.0256 -0.0051 0.0091 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0017
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0079) (0.0213) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0024)
gdp growth 0.0047 0.0125 0.0022 0.0491 -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0005
(0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0165) (0.0337) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0014)
inflation -0.0030 -0.0090 0.0023 -0.0026 -0.0004 -0.0006 0.0004
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0047) (0.0092) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0012)
inflation(-1) 0.0101 0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0133 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0040) (0.0087) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0008)
gdp growth(-1) 0.0405 0.0151 -0.0273 -0.0449 0.0005 0.0004 0.0061
(0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0171) (0.0329) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0033)
m2 / gdp (-1) -8.26 -2.94 25.78 38.04 -0.51 -0.59 -0.72
(1.91) (2.24) (5.74) (11.17) (0.31) (0.81) (1.19)
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 16.46 6.71 -2.02 -3.60 0.23 0.34 1.30
(2.52) (2.96) (7.60) (13.22) (0.28) (0.71) (1.22)
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 6.46 5.41 3.33 8.69 0.00 0.15 0.47
(1.20) (1.40) (3.34) (6.23) (0.12) (0.33) (0.44)
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.43 0.35 0.36
long term debt  / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio      (balance 
sheet+ratio)
short term debt    / 
assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
 
  
Table 1.8(*) (Real $, Deflator)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities -1.236 -0.732 1.208 -2.102 -0.027 0.083 -1.214
(0.182) (0.210) (0.861) (0.680) (0.019) (0.035) (0.456)
Net Portfolio Investment Position -0.440 -0.420 -0.128 -0.470 0.030 0.060 0.078
(0.030) (0.036) (0.149) (0.252) (0.008) (0.018) (0.191)
Deposit Bank Net Foreign Liab.ilities -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 0.0000 0.0000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.003)
CB + GOV + DB Net For. Curr. Liabilities 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.010 -0.002 0.000 0.0002 -0.002
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.002)
BOP Financial Account -1.515 -0.967 -1.703 -1.377 -0.032 0.032 -1.050
(0.122) (0.143) (0.556) (0.527) (0.015) (0.029) (0.348)
BOP Net Debt Liabilities -1.992 -1.335 -1.404 -3.731 -0.056 0.030 -2.409
(0.133) (0.155) (0.647) (0.516) (0.015) (0.027) (0.362)
BOP Net Equity Liabilities -1.559 -0.601 1.460 2.177 -0.079 -0.407 -0.291
(0.476) (0.555) (2.076) (3.671) (0.182) (0.478) (1.625)
(*) All numbers are multiplied by 104
Table 1.9(*) (Real $, CPI)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities -1.274 -0.776 1.063 -2.126 -0.027 0.086 -1.224
(0.179) (0.207) (0.846) (0.671) (0.019) (0.034) (0.453)
Net Portfolio Investment Position -0.437 -0.418 -0.093 -0.459 0.030 0.068 0.142
(0.030) (0.036) (0.150) (0.260) (0.008) (0.018) (0.196)
Deposit Bank Net Foreign Liabilities -0.004 -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
CB + GOV + DB Net For. Curr. Liabilities 0.001 0.000 -0.012 -0.003 0.0001 0.0002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00007) (0.0001) (0.002)
BOP Financial Account -1.478 -0.963 -1.536 -1.419 -0.030 0.035 -1.007
(0.118) (0.138) (0.540) (0.521) (0.015) (0.029) (0.342)
BOP Net Debt Liabilities -2.037 -1.405 -1.640 -3.725 -0.056 0.034 -2.478
(0.130) (0.151) (0.629) (0.505) (0.015) (0.027) (0.355)
BOP Net Equity Liabilities -1.624 -0.634 1.525 2.229 -0.082 -0.425 -0.304
(0.482) (0.563) (2.110) (3.738) (0.190) (0.498) (1.695)
(*) All numbers are multiplied by 104
long term debt    / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
long term debt    / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1.10(*) (Weighted dependent variables, GDP Ratios)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities -0.389 0.416 -1.350 0.425 0.004 0.006 -0.071
(0.209) (0.217) (0.375) (0.216) (0.002) (0.002) (0.030)
Net Portfolio Investment Position -0.059 -0.055 -0.724 -0.060 0.006 0.007 0.018
(0.155) (0.162) (0.139) (0.162) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021)
Deposit Bank Net Foreign Liab.ilities -0.579 -0.589 -1.232 -0.590 0.0018 0.0025 -0.048
(0.085) (0.088) (0.131) (0.088) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.010)
CB + GOV + DB Net For. Curr. Liabilities -0.1436 -0.1515 -0.507 -0.151 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.015
(0.0666) (0.0684) (0.103) (0.068) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.008)
BOP Financial Account -0.199 -0.200 -0.309 -0.199 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.086) (0.088) (0.136) (0.088) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
BOP Net Debt Liabilities -1.852 -2.100 -5.619 -2.033 0.028 0.025 -0.067
(0.595) (0.614) (1.973) (0.617) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022)
BOP Net Equity Liabilities -0.164 -0.113 -1.318 -0.108 0.007 0.009 -0.007
(0.265) (0.274) (0.440) (0.274) (0.002) (0.002) (0.038)
(*) All numbers are multiplied by 104
Table 1.11(*) (Weighted dependent variables, deflated by CPI)
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
BOP Net Portfolio Liabilities -5.473 -5.567 -3.103 -5.571 0.022 0.026 -0.576
(0.888) (0.914) (1.494) (0.912) (0.006) (0.007) (0.109)
Net Portfolio Investment Position -1.555 -1.522 -2.608 -1.535 0.008 0.010 0.002
(0.351) (0.372) (0.373) (0.371) (0.002) (0.003) (0.052)
Deposit Bank Net Foreign Liabilities -0.011 -0.014 -0.101 -0.014 -0.00001 0.00009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.001)
CB + GOV + DB Net For. Curr. Liabilities -0.016 -0.017 -0.027 -0.018 0.0001 0.0001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.00001) (0.0000) (0.000)
BOP Financial Account 0.469 0.411 1.327 0.400 0.005 0.005 -0.053
(0.347) (0.356) (0.543) (0.356) (0.002) (0.003) (0.042)
BOP Net Debt Liabilities -10.669 -10.545 -50.126 10.864 0.120 0.149 -0.337
(2.577) (2.665) (12.216) (2.674) (0.049) (0.055) (0.087)
BOP Net Equity Liabilities -0.940 1.062 -1.015 1.028 -0.023 -0.030 -0.340
(1.294) (1.338) (2.235) (1.337) (0.010) (0.012) (0.186)
(*) All numbers are multiplied by 104
long term debt    / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
long term debt    / 
assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt    / 
current assets
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2.1
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables ROE ROA ROI GM PTM NPM OM
quick ratio 2.26 1.02 0.33 0.06 6.76 3.96 2.02
(0.71) (0.15) (3.21) (0.04) (1.61) (1.47) (2.39)
intercept 10.62 -2.21 -390.66 -0.99 26.39 -10.11 -27.53
(4.86) (1.04) (339.92) (0.29) (11.31) (9.30) (51.56)
m2 / gdp -68.31 21.60 321.96 14.37 230.14 170.82 0.00
(45.01) (9.16) (2596.87) (3.02) (92.11) (85.46) 0.00
current account deficit / gdp -165.06 -20.09 0.00 -24.26 -258.62 -366.81 0.00
(56.89) (11.49) 0.00 (4.81) (96.22) (89.28) 0.00
budget deficit / gdp -118.67 4.54 -2458.59 -15.09 -242.76 -126.29 0.00
(31.13) (6.29) (2057.27) (2.14) (63.90) (58.90) 0.00
lending rate 0.08 0.01 4.04 0.03 0.24 0.02 -2.12
(0.06) (0.01) (4.78) (0.00) (0.13) (0.12) (1.31)
gdp growth 0.07 0.03 3.98 0.02 0.37 0.22 -0.52
(0.11) (0.02) (15.44) (0.01) (0.24) (0.22) (2.49)
inflation -0.10 -0.01 -3.64 -0.01 0.09 -0.18 3.47
(0.04) (0.01) (2.77) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08) (2.43)
inflation(-1) -0.02 0.00 7.95 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -1.96
(0.02) (0.00) (2.49) (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) (1.57)
gdp growth(-1) 0.23 0.07 -2.36 -0.04 0.51 0.27 2.37
(0.13) (0.03) (4.44) (0.01) (0.25) (0.23) (1.95)
m2 / gdp (-1) -38.16 10.48 -807.76 -7.89 -234.63 -106.50 0.00
(38.48) (7.74) (2689.35) (2.54) (84.88) (78.16) 0.00
current account deficit / gdp (-1) 394.36 -1.78 0.00 5.98 343.66 303.68 0.00
(76.53) (15.90) 0.00 (5.65) (153.29) (142.07) 0.00
budget deficit / gdp (-1) 127.21 2.63 1007.02 0.32 -23.15 26.25 -225.72
(24.81) (5.12) (2264.18) (1.70) (52.86) (48.92) (230.13)
dep. bank net foreign liabs/GDP -149.03 -14.05 -1255.48 -2.15 -72.10 -37.04 0.00
(20.68) (4.03) (1392.63) (1.82) (48.56) (44.86) 0.00
Adjusted R_Squared 0.39723 0.396 0.394801 0.492204 0.4348836 0.431861 0.51152  
 
 
 
 
 Table 2.2 Non Weighted Regressions
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables ROE ROA ROI GM PTM NPM OM
Quick Ratio 2.262 1.020 0.333 0.059 6.756 3.956 2.020
(0.714) (0.149) (3.206) (0.043) (1.609) (1.471) (2.395)
Current Ratio -0.684 0.565 -3.125 0.078 7.168 4.706 6.334
(0.528) (0.108) (1.792) (0.038) (1.028) (0.966) (1.385)
Current Ratio (balance sheet) 0.159 0.004 2.556 -0.220 6.55456 3.59950 10.555
(0.129) (0.027) (0.447) (0.061) (1.09284) (1.01323) (1.503)
0.315 0.037 2.600 0.001 6.5975 3.6360 10.602
(0.130) (0.028) (0.462) (0.007) (1.08980) (1.0108) (1.496)
Short Term Debt / Assets 20.360 -5.963 138.125 -0.082 -59.238 -59.570 -8.010
(7.742) (1.376) (22.402) (0.042) (18.549) (16.179) (21.759)
Short Term Debt / Current A. -0.535 -4.174 62.141 -0.080 -65.489 -59.449 -39.933
(4.750) (0.834) (13.270) (0.026) (8.330) (6.933) (10.990)
Long Term Debt / Assets -12.083 -0.371 -52.086 0.012 15.381 1.561 36.120
(3.140) (0.544) (11.399) (0.016) (7.388) (6.352) (11.873)
Table 2.3 Weighted Regressions
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables ROE ROA ROI GM PTM NPM OM
Quick Ratio -0.021 1.050 -0.001 0.030 0.455 0.378 0.098
(0.306) (0.270) (0.043) (0.007) (0.168) (0.151) (0.049)
Current Ratio -0.371 0.648 0.149 0.020 0.268 0.309 0.320
(0.219) (0.195) (0.030) (0.005) (0.122) (0.108) (0.032)
Current Ratio (balance sheet) 0.146 0.332 0.059 0.016 0.01098 -0.01797 0.157
(0.168) (0.150) (0.024) (0.004) (0.09328) (0.08351) (0.026)
-0.342 0.704 0.170 0.019 0.2545 -0.2842 0.321
(0.221) (0.196) (0.030) (0.005) (0.12219) (0.1091) (0.032)
Short Term Debt / Assets 1.106 -2.806 0.273 0.071 0.669 0.234 0.711
(2.261) (2.030) (0.321) (0.054) (1.256) (1.125) (0.365)
Short Term Debt / Current A. 0.439 -1.828 0.255 -0.108 1.383 0.395 0.259
(1.460) (1.310) (0.207) (0.035) (0.808) (0.726) (0.236)
Long Term Debt / Assets 1.355 -4.468 0.840 -0.049 -0.728 -0.913 0.319
(1.180) (1.039) (0.162) (0.028) (0.655) (0.586) (0.191)
current ratio                        
(balance sheet+ratio)
current ratio                        
(balance sheet+ratio)
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 Table 2.5 Non Crisis, Non Weighted Regressions
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables ROE ROA ROI GM PTM NPM OM
Quick Ratio -0.562 0.037 -22.164 0.025 3.066 0.413 7.884
(0.402) (0.079) (4.340) (0.029) (1.124) (1.018) (2.098)
Current Ratio -0.203 0.116 -6.421 0.002 2.262 0.093 3.137
(0.298) (0.059) (2.262) (0.020) (1.154) (0.998) (1.938)
Current Ratio (balance sheet) 0.206 0.009 0.362 -0.011 -1.29471 -3.11033 2.346
(0.029) (0.006) (0.197) (0.014) (1.24583) (1.04518) (0.549)
0.516 0.055 1.926 -0.001 -1.3080 -3.1199 2.359
(0.100) (0.019) (0.387) (0.005) (1.24573) (1.0454) (0.551)
Short Term Debt / Assets 55.177 26.949 -127.661 0.406 93.140 65.860 59.798
(18.141) (3.355) (51.757) (0.054) (25.259) (26.302) (20.381)
Short Term Debt / Current A. -24.055 -1.654 -9.654 0.160 52.863 50.957 4.731
(5.935) (1.079) (3.894) (0.021) (15.367) (15.654) (1.454)
Long Term Debt / Assets -12.224 -0.412 -8.394 -0.062 -47.753 -37.055 -5.502
(3.467) (0.600) (1.549) (0.009) (6.576) (6.273) (1.872)
Table 2.6 Non Crisis, Weighted Regressions
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables ROE ROA ROI GM PTM NPM OM
Quick Ratio 0.318 0.626 -0.033 0.015 0.789 0.842 0.013
(0.248) (0.221) (0.035) (0.006) (0.132) (0.116) (0.040)
Current Ratio -0.074 0.444 0.069 0.011 0.633 0.592 0.176
(0.185) (0.165) (0.026) (0.004) (0.098) (0.087) (0.029)
Current Ratio (balance sheet) 0.207 0.210 0.021 0.009 0.49202 0.46381 0.082
(0.141) (0.126) (0.020) (0.003) (0.07415) (0.06597) (0.022)
-0.052 0.481 0.083 0.010 0.6477 0.6137 0.175
(0.186) (0.165) (0.026) (0.004) (0.09776) (0.0869) (0.029)
Short Term Debt / Assets 1.060 -2.773 0.275 0.071 0.583 0.151 0.714
(2.262) (2.031) (0.321) (0.054) (1.256) (1.125) (0.365)
Short Term Debt / Current A. 0.418 -1.812 0.256 -0.108 1.344 0.359 0.259
(1.459) (1.310) (0.207) (0.035) (0.808) (0.726) (0.236)
Long Term Debt / Assets 2.463 -4.969 0.636 -0.075 2.978 2.648 -0.137
(1.356) (1.198) (0.190) (0.033) (0.741) (0.663) (0.221)
current ratio                        
(balance sheet+ratio)
current ratio                        
(balance sheet+ratio)
 
 
 Table 3.1: Non Weighted, Overall Sample
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
E-R Volatility ($) -0.033 -0.009 0.050 0.113 -0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.030) (0.061) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen 
equally weighted) -1.199 -0.640 2.138 2.766 -0.034 0.129 0.040
(0.424) (0.591) (1.477) (2.261) (0.062) (0.100) (0.144)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen, 
Region Adjusted) -0.989 -0.513 2.252 3.123 -0.0529 0.0940 0.099
(0.429) (0.597) (1.473) (2.274) (0.0630) (0.1010) (0.147)
I-R Volatility (Lending Rates) -0.0038 -0.0046 -0.010 -0.004 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.000
(0.0030) (0.0041) (0.011) (0.016) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.001)
I-R Volatility (Deposit Rates) 0.343 0.144 -0.103 0.198 -0.054 -0.024 -0.023
(0.161) (0.224) (0.592) (0.857) (0.024) (0.038) (0.054)
Table 3.2: Weighted, Overall Sample
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
E-R Volatility ($) -0.006 -0.003 -0.030 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen 
equally weighted) -0.141 -0.393 -1.119 -0.357 0.045 0.149 -0.019
(0.186) (0.258) (0.335) (0.257) (0.016) (0.039) (0.031)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen, 
Region Adjusted) -0.082 -0.331 -1.106 -0.296 0.0455 0.1340 0.023
(0.187) (0.260) (0.336) (0.258) (0.0164) (0.0396) (0.031)
I-R Volatility (Lending Rates) -0.0062 -0.0180 -0.017 -0.019 -0.0009 -0.0013 0.0010
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.004) (0.003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004)
I-R Volatility (Deposit Rates) 0.035 -0.068 0.009 -0.054 -0.025 0.023 -0.001
(0.088) (0.110) (0.154) (0.109) (0.008) (0.019) (0.015)
long term debt 
/ assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt 
/ current assets
long term debt 
/ assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt 
/ current assets
 
 Table 3.3: Non Weighted, Non Crisis
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
E-R Volatility ($) 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.014 0.0003 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.026) (0.010) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen 
equally weighted) 0.172 0.278 1.049 0.695 0.015 0.039 -0.054
(0.140) (0.178) (1.525) (0.595) (0.009) (0.020) (0.023)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen, 
Region Adjusted) 0.163 0.268 1.059 0.693 0.0149 0.0343 -0.052
(0.140) (0.178) (1.532) (0.600) (0.0087) (0.0204) (0.023)
I-R Volatility (Lending Rates) 0.0057 0.0027 0.030 0.017 0.0002 0.0010 -0.002
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.032) (0.012) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.001)
I-R Volatility (Deposit Rates) 0.369 0.280 2.185 0.901 0.003 0.063 -0.083
(0.130) (0.168) (1.438) (0.547) (0.008) (0.018) (0.022)
Table 3.4: Weighted, Non Crisis
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables quick ratio current ratio
E-R Volatility ($) -0.036 -0.062 -0.089 -0.061 -0.001 0.002 -0.004
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen 
equally weighted) -0.376 -0.965 -1.686 -0.929 0.053 0.086 -0.029
(0.229) (0.304) (0.395) (0.303) (0.016) (0.039) (0.032)
E-R Volatility ($, Euro, Yen, 
Region Adjusted) -0.340 -0.922 -1.694 -0.887 0.0530 0.0727 -0.035
(0.230) (0.305) (0.397) (0.305) (0.0162) (0.0391) (0.032)
I-R Volatility (Lending Rates) -0.0087 -0.0205 -0.020 -0.021 -0.001 0.0000 -0.0012
(0.0029) (0.0039) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.0005) (0.0004)
I-R Volatility (Deposit Rates) -0.158 -0.213 -0.128 -0.198 -0.026 0.007 -0.025
(0.107) (0.145) (0.193) (0.145) (0.008) (0.019) (0.015)
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt 
/ current assets
long term debt 
/ assets
long term debt 
/ assets
current ratio 
(balance sheet)
current ratio 
(balance sheet+ratio)
short term debt 
/ assets
short term debt 
/ current assets
 
